SI i e 1	Module 6: Exotic Avian DiseasesUSDA-APHIS National Veterinary Accreditation Program (NVAP)Image: Distribution of the second	Welcome to Module 6: Exotic Avian Diseases. This module was developed as supplemental training for the USDA- APHIS National Veterinary Accreditation Program (NVAP) by the Center for Food Security and Public Health at the College of Veterinary Medicine, Iowa State University. The content for this module was finalized in February 2015. <i>Presenters: As designed, slide completion time ranges from</i> 30 to 90 seconds each, such that the entire presentation can be completed in 60 minutes. For this topic, there are four handouts that will be referred to during this presentation and two factsheets that are resources for you to prepare and answer questions. All can be found at the end of this PDF and are available in the corresponding web module and print manual. You may want to print out hard copies and have them with you for demonstration purposes and to answer
SI d e 2	Tablet Sign in • New method for sign in • Replaces paper sign in sheet • To ensure you get credit you must sign in for each module using the iPad circulated around the room	<i>questions during the presentation.</i> We have a new tablet method for allowing accredited veterinarians to sign in for AAST. This method will replace the paper sign in. In order to ensure the AV gets credit for each module they must ensure they sign in for all sessions delivered. So if they sit through 4 modules of AAST they must sign in using the iPad 4 times.
SI i d e 3	Directions Tap on the first name field and then on each subsequent field on the iPad screen Date of birth must be entered as: MM/DD/YYYY Select submit Read the confirmation screen to ensure the information displayed is yours Select confirm Pass the tablet to the next participant 	In order for the key pad to display the participants must first tap the first field on the screen (first name field). This will display the key pad. The participant must then either tap the stylus pen or their finger into each subsequent field on the screen. The user must tap into each field for birthdate - meaning they must tap into the month field, into the day field and into the year field. Participants must not forget to enter the year as a 4 digit value - i.e. 1969 not just 69.
SI i d e 4	If No Match Found • Your name must match exactly what is in our records. e.g. "Jim" not "James", "McDonald" vs "Mc Donald" • If "No Match Found" displays on the screen after you attempt to enter your name and date of birth twice, pass the tablet to the next participant and see the instructor after the session.	However if they have not entered the data the way it is entered into our database they will get a No Match Found message. They should attempt to re-enter the data two more times and then pass the tablet to the next participant. They must see the instructor after the presentation to ensure they do get credit for the module they have taken. Certain reasons their name is not displayed include: Their name is not entered correctly - James vs Jim, McDonald vs McDonald vs Mc Donald etc.

SI i d e 5	 Supplemental Training Print clearly on the sign-in sheets. It is critical that we have your current email address for your accreditation renewal. If you do not know your 6 digit National Accreditation Number, please see me at the conclusion of the presentation. You will receive a Certificate of Completion during the presentation. Keep your Certificate of Completion forever- do not send it to APHIS. 	
SI i d 6	Supplemental Training (AST) modules are also available on our website with interactive features and links to additional Web resources. • Type "NVAP" into your search engine e.g. Bing, Google, Yahoo.	
SI i d 7	 Supplemental Training Familiarize accredited veterinarians with animal health regulatory concepts and activities Does not supersede the regulations Does not up-to-date regulations and standards, please refer to: Code of Federal Regulations Local VS District Office 	Presenters: Please make sure your audience understands the intent of this information by reading what is written here. This informational presentation is intended to familiarize accredited veterinarians with animal health regulatory concepts and activities. Information presented here does not supersede the regulations. For the most up-to-date regulations and standards, please refer to the Code of Federal Regulations and your local VS District Office (website listed on the slide).
SI i d e 8	Overview Economic impact Hazards of less virulent forms of avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease (ND) viruses Clinical signs of HPAI and END Biosecurity measures Reporting an exotic avian disease	 This presentation will: Describe the economic impact of an exotic avian disease outbreak, Describe the hazards presented by less virulent forms of avian influenza (AI) and Newcastle disease (ND) viruses, Demonstrate the clinical signs associated with high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) and exotic Newcastle disease (END), Review basic biosecurity measures for these diseases, Describe how to report a possible exotic avian disease and the investigative process

SI i d 9	<text><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item>Pet Birds• 140+ board certified avian• 140+ board certified avian• 140+ board certified avian• Away more• Away more• Away more• Away more• 6 of U.S households• 11.2 million pet birds• 100.8 million in veterinary costs• 9 per bird• 2008 million• 2018 million• 2019 million• 2018 million• 2018 million• 2019 million• 2018 million• 2019 mill</list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></text>	Over 140 veterinarians, board certified in avian practice, along with many more practicing veterinarians, care for the nation's pet bird population. It is estimated that 4% of U.S. households contain pet birds. Mean veterinary care expenditures for the nation's 11.2 million pet birds was \$9 per bird; approximately \$100.8 million. <i>Source:</i> 2007 U.S. Pet Ownership and Demographics Sourcebook, American Veterinary Medical Association.
SI i d e 1 0	 U.S. Commercial Poultry 2nd largest exporter of poultry meat 2nd largest egg producer 2009: Total poultry farm value exceeded \$20 billion 400+ veterinarians involved in health management of 450 million birds 	The U.S. commercial poultry industry contributes to the global market. The U.S. is the world's second largest exporter of poultry meat and the world's second largest egg producer. In 2009, total farm value of U.S. poultry production exceeded \$20 billion. There are over 400 veterinarians involved in the health management of more than 450 million birds in this country.
SI i d e 1 1	Poultry Hobbyists 9. Single birds 9. Backyard flocks 9. Pleasure Meat or egg production 0. Exhibition Breeding 3. Sport	Poultry hobbyists consist of individuals who keep single birds or backyard flocks for pleasure, meat or egg production, exhibition, breeding or sport.
SI i d e 1 2	Avian Diseases	Avian diseases that can be transmitted from pet birds to the commercial poultry industry.

SI i d e 1 3	 biseases introduced by Fomites People Wild birds Illegal cockfighting 25,000 per year Birds may appear ill or be subclinically infected 	Avian diseases can be introduced and spread between bird populations in a variety of ways. Birds kept as companions or raised as a hobby often have less strict biosecurity protocols in place as compared to commercial poultry. Exotic Newcastle disease (END) and high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) are two exotic avian diseases that can be spread on fomites* and by people. *Fomites are contaminated inanimate objects. For instance, clothing worn while handling pet birds and then into a commercial poultry facility has the potential to harbor disease agents. Small flocks of backyard poultry used in illegal cockfighting have been implicated in the transmission of contagious diseases to commercial poultry operations. Backyard poultry also have contact with wild birds and could introduce disease agents acquired from these birds to commercial flocks. Exotic avian diseases can be introduced through the illegal smuggling of birds into the United States. It is estimated that over 25,000 birds are smuggled in each year. Birds that carry disease agents may appear ill or they may be subclinically infected.
SI i d e 1 4	Exotic Avian Diseases • Highly contagious foreign animal diseases (FADs) • Exotic Newcastle disease (END) • High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) • Often fatal in birds • Indistinguishable clinical signs • Resemble common illnesses • Can cause illness in humans	The two exotic avian diseases that are the focus of this presentation include Exotic Newcastle disease (END) and high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI). They are highly contagious foreign animal diseases (FADs) and often fatal in birds. Their clinical signs are indistinguishable from each other. These serious FADs can also resemble some common illnesses seen in poultry and pet birds. Both can cause illness in humans, from mild conjunctivitis with an END infection to severe respiratory disease and death from HPAI. The prompt recognition and control of these diseases is imperative to protect animal and human health.
SI i d e 1 5	Newcastle Disease	Presenters: The Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) Disease Brief handout provides additional disease information to prepare for this presentation and to answer questions should they arise. It can be found at the end of this PDF. If participants are interested, they can obtain the handout in the web module and in the appendix of the print manual.

SI	Newo	castle Disease	e (ND)	Newcastle disease virus
i	• Avian par	amyxovirus-1 (/	APMV-1)	paramyxovirus-1 (APM)
d	– Genus A	vulavirus		Paramyxovirus). APMV three pathotypes, based of
	 Family Pa Pathotype 	aramyxovirus	SAL	lentogenic (least virulent
	on virulen	18		or velogenic (most virule
	– Lentogen	nic, mesogenic, ve	logenic	in the U.S. We will discu
		rms, often over	 SC26042804 	the next slide. The patho
		pic: Respiratory, nei opic: Hemorrhagic ii		-
	USDA-APHIS National Veterinary Accreditatio		February 2015 for Food Security and Public Health	neurotropic form, which respiratory and neurolog
				with hemorrhagic intesti
				Ū.
				overlap and are rarely cl
	Newcast	le Disease Pa	ithotypes	Newcastle disease (ND)
	Lentogenic	Mesogenic	Velogenic	mesogenic, and velogenic common in wild and dor
	Common	Uncommon	Absent in U.S.	
		Intermediate virulence: Occasional neurological	Most serious poultry disease	world. These viruses are
	3	signs	in world	sometimes cause mild re
		disease, decreased egg quality, weight loss	Death without clinical signs	production and/or weigh
	Negligible mortality	Low mortality	High mortality	negligible. Lentogenic an
	No eff	fect on trade	Shut down trade	productivity, but do not a
11	USDA-APHIS National Veterinary Accreditatio	n Program Center :	February 2015 for Food Security and Public Health	APMV-1 viruses, which
	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			virulence. These viruses
				decreased egg production
				are occasionally associat
				mortality rate is relativel
				viruses can decrease pro
				international trade. Velo
				from domesticated birds
				serious poultry diseases
				virulent that, in very sus
				many birds die before sh
				presence in commercial
				trade. Velogenic APMV
				imported birds, but they
				pathogenic APMV-1 vir
	Definitio	n of Newcastl	e Disease	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas
				pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for
	• END = Visc Disease (U.	erotropic velogeni .S.)	ic Newcastle	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 viruse
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru 	cerotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis	ic Newcastle	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact internationa
	• END = Visc Disease (U.	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal)	ic Newcastle	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 viruse strains, impact internationa Organization for Animal H
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation) Both report Gallinaceout 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su:	ic Newcastle sease sceptible	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact internationa
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation) Both report Gallinaceout 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar	ic Newcastle sease sceptible	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 viruse strains, impact internationa Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation Both report Gallinaceou Chickens partridge Wild, dome 	erotropic velogeni .S.) ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar es, quail esticated: mild to s	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 viruse strains, impact internationa Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te highly pathogenic (velogen
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation Both report Gallinaceou Chickens partridge Wild, dome Psittacine s 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar s, quail isticated: mild to s species: carrier sta	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe ite	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcass viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact international Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te highly pathogenic (velogen not be recognized outside t health certificate, the diseas Newcastle disease (vND).
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation Both report Gallinaceou Chickens partridge Wild, dome 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar s, quail isticated: mild to s species: carrier sta	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact internationa Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te highly pathogenic (velogen not be recognized outside t health certificate, the disea Newcastle disease (vND). *The World Organization for
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation Both report Gallinaceou Chickens partridge Wild, dome Psittacine s 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar s, quail isticated: mild to s species: carrier sta	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe ite	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact international Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te highly pathogenic (velogen not be recognized outside t health certificate, the disea Newcastle disease (vND). *The World Organization for the Office International des
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation Both report Gallinaceou Chickens partridge Wild, dome Psittacine s 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar s, quail isticated: mild to s species: carrier sta	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe ite	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact international Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te highly pathogenic (velogen not be recognized outside t health certificate, the diseas Newcastle disease (vND). *The World Organization f the Office International des body that sets standards for
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation) Both report Gallinaceou - Chickens partridge Wild, dome Psittacine s 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar s, quail isticated: mild to s species: carrier sta	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe ite	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact international Organization for Animal H module, END will be the techinghly pathogenic (velogen not be recognized outside t health certificate, the diseas Newcastle disease (vND). *The World Organization for the Office International des body that sets standards for diseases") affecting international
	 END = Visc Disease (U. vND = Viru (Internation Both report Gallinaceou - Chickens partridge Wild, dome Psittacine s 	erotropic velogeni .S.) Ilent Newcastle Dis nal) table to OIE Is birds: highly su , turkeys, pheasar s, quail isticated: mild to s species: carrier sta	ic Newcastle sease sceptible nts, severe ite	pathogenic APMV-1 vir In the U.S., exotic Newcas viscerotropic velogenic for pathogenic APMV-1 virus strains, impact international Organization for Animal H module, END will be the te highly pathogenic (velogen not be recognized outside t health certificate, the diseas Newcastle disease (vND). *The World Organization f the Office International des body that sets standards for

Newcastle disease viruses are of the serogroup avian paramyxovirus-1 (APMV-1) in the genus *Avulavirus* (family Paramyxovirus). APMV-1 isolates can be classified as one of hree pathotypes, based on their virulence for chickens – entogenic (least virulent), mesogenic (moderately virulent), or velogenic (most virulent). The milder strains are endemic n the U.S. We will discuss the pathotypes in more detail on he next slide. The pathotypes can also be subdivided into a neurotropic form, which is typically associated with respiratory and neurologic signs, and a viscerotropic form with hemorrhagic intestinal lesions. These clinical forms overlap and are rarely clear-cut. Newcastle disease (ND) pathotypes include lentogenic, mesogenic, and velogenic. Lentogenic APMV-1 viruses are common in wild and domesticated birds throughout the world. These viruses are often carried subclinically, but they sometimes cause mild respiratory disease, decreased egg production and/or weight loss. The mortality rate is usually negligible. Lentogenic and mesogenic viruses can decrease productivity, but do not affect international trade. Mesogenic APMV-1 viruses, which are uncommon, are intermediate in virulence. These viruses can cause respiratory signs, decreased egg production and quality, and weight loss. They are occasionally associated with neurological signs, but the nortality rate is relatively low. Lentogenic and mesogenic viruses can decrease productivity, but do not affect nternational trade. Velogenic APMV-1 viruses are absent from domesticated birds in the U.S and cause one of the most serious poultry diseases in the world. These viruses are so virulent that, in very susceptible species such as chickens, nany birds die before showing any clinical signs. Their presence in commercial poultry can shut down international rade. Velogenic APMV-1 viruses are often introduced in mported birds, but they may also arise by mutation from less pathogenic APMV-1 viruses. In the U.S., exotic Newcastle disease (END) is defined as the viscerotropic velogenic form of the disease. However, all highly bathogenic APMV-1 viruses, including neurotropic velogenic strains, impact international trade and must be reported to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)*. For the purposes of this nodule, END will be the term used for the disease caused by any highly pathogenic (velogenic) APMV-1 virus. The term END may not be recognized outside the U.S. When filling out an international health certificate, the disease should be referred to as velogenic

*The World Organization for Animal Health, formerly known as the Office International des Epizooties or OIE, is the international body that sets standards for important animal diseases ("OIE-listed diseases") affecting international trade. The OIE also collects and disseminates information about disease outbreaks. Nations recognized as free of an OIE-listed disease must report any change in this status to the OIE immediately. END and HPAI are both OIE-

		listed. END is highly contagious and has serious consequences for infected poultry. Chickens and some other gallinaceous** birds are very susceptible to this disease; the morbidity and mortality rates can be as high as 100%. Other species of wild and domesticated birds can be mildly to severely affected. A carrier state exists in some birds, particularly psittacine*** species. **Gallinaceous: Family of birds that includes chickens, turkeys, pheasants, partridges, quail and other related birds. ***Psittacine: Family of birds which includes parrots, macaws and parakeets.
Sl i d e 1 9	Public Health Significance • Humans are only mammals usceptible to vND • Jaccination or laboratory exposure • Conjunctivitis • Resolves without treatment • Virus shed in ocular discharge • Avoid bird contact	Next we will review the public health significance of exotic Newcastle disease. Humans are the only mammals known to be susceptible to velogenic Newcastle diseasen (vND). Exposure to large amounts of the virus, typically during vaccination or in the laboratory, has resulted in conjunctivitis. This generally resolves rapidly without treatment but the virus is shed in ocular discharge up to one week; avoiding bird contact during this time is suggested. Photo: A person with conjunctivitis, which is a sequellae to exposure to END virus without wearing the proper personal protective equipment.
SI i d e 2 0	Avian Influenza	Presenters: The high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) Disease Brief handout provides additional disease information to prepare for this presentation and to answer questions should they arise. It can be found at the end of this PDF. If participants are interested, they can obtain the handout in the web module and in the appendix of the print manual.
SI d e 2 1	<text><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item> Openation Openation</list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></text>	Worldwide there are many strains of avian influenza (AI) viruses (genus <i>influenzavirus A</i> , family Orthomyxoviridae). Two highly variable surface antigens, the hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) proteins, are used to classify AI viruses into subtypes. There are 16 hemagglutinin (H1 to H16) and 9 neuraminidase (N1 to N9) proteins. H5N1 is an example of a subtype. Within a subtype, there are many related and unrelated strains with varying virulence.


SI	Al Cotanaria	Avian
i	AI Categories	low pa
d	Based on virulence, genetic sequence	virulen
-	Low pathogenicity (LPAI) – Replicate only in limited locations	pathog
e	(respiratory, gastrointestinal tracts)	only in
2	Few or no clinical signsHigh pathogenicity (HPAI)	gastroi
2	– Replicate systematically	signs in
	 Serious, fatal disease in chickens, some other birds 	(HPAI
		that all
	USDA.A9HIS February 2015 National Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	typical
		and so
SI	AI Subtypes	Avian
i		H5 and
d	HPAI hemagglutinin variants H5 and H7	vary w
	Effects vary with species	most o
e	- Severe disease in chickens and turkeys,	turkeys
2	not in waterfowl – Morbidity, mortality	suscep
3	may approach 100% • H5 and H7 LPAI viruses	100%.
	can mutate into HPAI viruses	HPAI
	1150 A 45415 Exbrany 3015	causes
	USDA.APHIS February 2015 National Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	LPAI
		any typ
SI	HPAI Public Health Significance	Next w
i		pathog
d	Serious zoonotic disease Hong Kong, 1997	cases o
e	18 hospitalized, 6 deaths	like sig
	 Netherlands, 2003 • 89 infected, 1 death 	disease
2	- Southeast Asia, 2003-present	an AI y
4	• 512 cases, 304 deaths (as of Dec 2010) • ongoing	Kong i
	If avian H5N1 adapts to humans,	died of
	possible severe human pandemic USD APHIS USD APHIS USD APHIS February 2015 Kational Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	Infection
	renormi reserinin y recessioni ringrani Canta for rood security and rubic realth	Preven
		infecte
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Avian influenza viruses are classified into two categories, ow pathogenicity and high pathogenicity, based on their virulence in chickens and their genetic sequence. Low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses can replicate only in limited locations (primarily the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts), and usually cause few or no clinical signs in infected birds. High pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have changes in the hemagglutinin proteins that allow them to replicate systemically. HPAI viruses ypically cause a serious and often fatal disease in chickens and some other birds.

influenza subtypes: Only two hemagglutinin variants, d H7, are found in HPAI viruses. The effects of HPAI with the species of bird. Although there are exceptions, of these viruses cause severe disease in chickens and s, but not in waterfowl such as ducks and geese. In tible species, morbidity and mortality may approach Any AI virus with the genetic characteristics of an virus is now classified in this group, even if it only mild illness. Also important to note is that H5 and H7 viruses can mutate into HPAI viruses, and outbreaks of pe of avian influenza need prompt attention. we will review the **public health significance** of **high** genicity avian influenza (HPAI). Although many of HPAI have been limited to conjunctivitis or mild flugns in people, HPAI can also be a serious zoonotic e resulting in serious illness and deaths. The first time virus was shown to infect humans occurred in Hong in 1997 when H5N1 hospitalized 18 people and six f the illness. Source: Avian Influenza A Virus ions of Humans, Centers for Disease Control and ntion. The 2003 outbreak of H7N7 in the Netherlands ed 89 people. Most developed only conjunctivitis, but a ople had influenza symptoms and one veterinarian e severely ill and died. The most significant HPAI ak affecting humans to date began in 2003. H5N1 ed in Southeast Asia and as of December 29, 2010, 512 med human cases had been reported to the World Organization; 304 of these cases were fatal. Most of infections have been reported from Asia and Egypt, and cases have also been confirmed in Africa, Azerbaijan, ddle East and Turkey. There are fears that an avian virus could eventually become adapted to humans, ng in a severe human pandemic. Updated human cs can be found at The World Health Organization e.


SI d e 2 5	History & Impact	
Sl i d e 2 6	History of Newcastle Disease Discovered in 1926 England and Indonesia Velogenic outbreaks 1930s in U.S. Mesogenic and lentogenic strains Preumoencephalitis – CA 1940s Spread across U.S. Decomposition Methods Velocitation Program Methods M	Newcastle disease was discovered in 1926, at Newcastle-on- Tyne, England and in Java, an island in Indonesia. These outbreaks were caused by highly virulent (velogenic) viruses. Several panzootics* followed. The first, which began in 1926, spread very slowly. Later outbreaks spread much more rapidly, because transportation of animals and people had become more efficient. Milder forms of Newcastle disease, caused by mesogenic and lentogenic strains, were discovered later. Such forms were first recognized in the United States in the 1930s, with outbreaks of pneumoencephalitis in California. By the mid-1940s, the disease had spread across the United States. *A panzootic is an outbreak of infectious disease in animals that spreads across a large region (several countries, a continent, even worldwide). Referred to as a pandemic in humans.
SI d e 2 7	 History of Exotic Jewcastle Disease Hore the ported U.S. cases Hore the birds from Hong Kong 1971 Southern CA History Southern CAS Hardication cost \$56 million Cost: \$160 million Trade impact: \$395 million 	The first reported cases of exotic Newcastle disease (END) in the United States appeared in 1950 and occurred in partridges and pheasants that were imported from Hong Kong. The disease spread to five farms, but it was quickly eliminated by destroying the infected birds. In 1971, a major outbreak of END occurred in commercial poultry flocks in southern California after the arrival of infected pet birds from Latin America. It took nearly 2.5 years to eradicate the disease, and almost 12 million birds were destroyed on over 1,300 premises. At the time, the eradication effort cost taxpayers approximately \$56 million. In October 2002, END was confirmed in the State of California. Subsequently, the disease spread into Nevada, Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico. The spread of the disease was due in part to illegal cockfighting. Approximately 4 million birds on 2,701 premises had to be depopulated. Eradication efforts surrounding this outbreak cost taxpayers \$160 million. The impact from trade restrictions was estimated at \$395 million, which included the direct costs of lost exports along with additional indirect costs.

SI d e 2 8	<section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><list-item><list-item><section-header><section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></section-header></section-header></list-item></list-item></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header>	The global impact of END is enormous. In developed countries, outbreaks of END are extremely costly to eradicate in order to minimize international trade losses. Control measures, including vaccination, are also a continuing economic loss. Countries free of END are faced with repeated testing to maintain that status for trade purposes. In developing countries with endemic END, this disease limits the development of a well-established commercial poultry industry and creating sustainable trade links. Many developing countries also rely on village chickens to supply a significant portion of dietary protein in the form of eggs and meat, especially for women and children. Continued losses from END directly affect the quantity and quality of the food for people living on marginal diets.
SI	History of Avian Influenza	Avian influenza was first identified in Italy, during a high
i		pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) epizootic* in 1878. The first HPAI outbreak in the U.S. was reported in 1924.
d	1878: Italy HPAI epizootic 1924: First U.S. outbreak	Between 1901 and 1930, the disease was also documented in
е	• 1901-1930: Europe, North and South	Europe, North and South America, Egypt, China and Japan.
2	America, Egypt, China, Japan • Early 2000s: H5N1 (HPAI) viruses	Since that time, outbreaks have occurred sporadically in
9	established in Asia, Egypt – Repeated, severe epizootics	many countries throughout the world. Since the early 2000s,
	– Spread to other continents	H5N1 (HPAI) viruses have become established in Asia and
	USDA-APHIS National Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	Egypt. These viruses have caused repeated, severe epizootics in that region and, in some cases, have spread to other
		continents.
		*Epizootic is an outbreak among animals that occurs at a
		particular time but does not persist.
SI	Economic Impact of HPAI	The economic impacts from high pathogenicity avian
i		influenza (HPAI) vary depending on the strain of virus,
d	Direct losses – Costs of depopulation, disposal,	species of bird infected, number of farms involved, density of
е	cleaning, disinfection, quarantines, surveillance, indemnity	poultry populations, control methods used, and the speed of
3	– Damage to economy from trade restrictions Indirect losses	implementation of control or eradication strategies. Even under favorable conditions, outbreaks of HPAI can be
0	- Lost wages, reduced commerce, lower prices	extremely difficult to control. Direct economic losses due to
	for poultry products, higher consumer prices – Decreased tourism	an HPAI outbreak include the costs of depopulation, disposal,
	- Cost of replacement animals	cleaning, disinfection, quarantines and surveillance, as well
	USD.A.RHIS February 2015 National Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	as indemnities paid for the elimination of birds, production
		losses, and damage to the economy from trade restrictions.
		Indirect losses result from things such as lost wages, reduced commerce, lower prices for poultry products due to increased
		supply in domestic markets, higher prices for consumers in
		countries no longer receiving U.S. product, decreased
		tourism, and the cost of purchasing replacement animals.




Additional economic losses from HPAI occurred in 1983 from an outbreak of H5N2 in the northeastern United States and took 2 years to control. This outbreak resulted in the destruction of more than 17 million birds and direct losses totaling nearly \$65 million (which corresponds to approximately \$143 million dollars in 2010). A 30% increase in retail egg prices and indirect costs estimated at more than \$250 million were also reported. Outbreaks in other countries have also been costly. In the 1999-2000 outbreak of HPAI (H7N1) in Italy, the government paid farmers \$100 million (USD) in compensation for 18 million birds. Total indirect losses were estimated at \$500 million (USD). Globally the most important HPAI viruses are the Asian lineage H5N1 viruses. These viruses caused outbreaks among poultry in Hong Kong in the late 1990s. The 2003 outbreak of high pathogenicity avian influenza (H7N7) in the Netherlands, which spread to Germany and Belgium, resulted in the destruction of 30 million birds in the Netherlands – a quarter of the nation's poultry stock. In 2003, H5N1 viruses emerged in Southeast Asia and caused widespread outbreaks among domesticated poultry. These viruses eventually spread into domesticated or wild birds in other regions of Asia, and have also affected parts of Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa. Although some countries have eradicated Asian lineage H5N1 viruses from their domesticated poultry, this epizootic is ongoing and worldwide eradication is not expected in the short term. The Asian lineage H5N1 viruses have also caused disease in other mammals including various large felids, housecats, dogs, palm civets, stone martens, mink and raccoon dogs. These viruses have been detected in domesticated pigs and wild pikas, and experimental infections have been established in foxes, ferrets, rodents and rabbits. Their full host range may still be unknown. Asian lineage H5N1 (HPAI) viruses have been found in many species of wild birds, which is unusual. Some of these birds have been severely affected. The cost of eradication and lost trade can reach millions of dollars from a small, controlled outbreak with only regionalized exports banned. In a larger outbreak, this figure could reach into the billions of dollars.

SI	North American Outbreaks	North America has experienced HPAI outbreaks in recent
i	North American Outbreaks	years. The last outbreak of HPAI (H5N2) in Mexico occurred
_	Mexico – 1995, last HPAI outbreak (H5N2)	in 1995, but related low pathogenicity (LPAI) viruses have
d	– LPAI viruses not entirely eliminated	not been entirely eliminated from the country. These viruses
е	Canada 2004 British Columbia (UZN2)	persist despite years of vaccination and eradication efforts.
3	 2004, British Columbia (H7N3) LPAI form from wild birds 	Canada reported its first outbreak of HPAI to the OIE in
3	At least 2 humans cases 2007, Saskatchewan (H7N3)	2004. This H7N3 virus was probably introduced into a
5	United States	poultry flock, in the LPAI form, from wild birds in British
	– 1983, Pennsylvania (H5N2) – 2004, Texas (H5N2)	Columbia. It was linked to two cases of conjunctivitis and
	USDA-APHIS February 2015 National Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	flu-like illness in people, with several other suspected but
		unconfirmed cases. In 2007, a different H7N3 virus caused an
		HPAI outbreak in Saskatchewan. It also seems to have come
		from wild birds. In the U.S., no HPAI outbreaks were
		reported for approximately 20 years after the 1983 H5N2
		epizootic in Pennsylvania. In 2004, an H5N2 HPAI virus was
		isolated from a Texas broiler chicken flock that supplied live
		bird markets. This virus did not cause severe disease when
		tested in chickens, but its genetic makeup suggested it could.
		For this reason, it was classified as an HPAI virus and the
		flock was depopulated.
SI	United States LPAI Outbreaks	In the U.S., LPAI outbreaks are carefully monitored. LPAI
i		viruses cause little or no illness and they may not be detected
d	Little or no illness Detected during testing	unless the flock is tested regularly for AI viruses. Since the
	Prompt LPAI control to	birds develop immunity to the LPAI viruses, related HPAI
e	decrease HPAI outbreaks • H5 and H7 LPAI outbreaks	viruses that arise may cause less obvious clinical signs.
3	since 2004	Prompt control of LPAI cases is necessary to decrease the
4	 Turkeys, broilers, upland game birds, breeding stock, 	likelihood of HPAI outbreaks. The U.S. has identified several
	backyard flocks – Depopulated, indemnity paid	H5 and H7 LPAI outbreaks since 2004 affecting turkeys,
		broilers, upland game birds, breeding stock, and backyard
	USDA-APHIS National Veterinary Accreditation Program Center for Food Security and Public Health	flocks. In each case, the flocks were depopulated, and
		indemnity and response costs paid. These outbreaks illustrate
		the hazards of H5 and H7 LPAI viruses in poultry flocks.
SI		Both END and HPAI are highly contagious, often fatal
i		diseases that are CLINICALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE
4		from each other. Mortality rates can be up to 100% for both
d	END and HPAI	diseases.
е	Disease Information	
3		
5		



Sl i d 9 9	<text><text><list-item><list-item><list-item> E-f. Hemorrhagic lesions of the GI tract 6. Decreased egg production, soft-shelled or misshapen eggs. 7. Greenish, watery diarrhea 8. Greenish, watery diarrhea</list-item></list-item></list-item></text></text>	Clinical signs of END and HPAI in poultry also include: E & F. Hemorrhagic lesions of the gastrointestinal tract G. Decreased egg production; soft-shelled or misshapen eggs H. Greenish, watery diarrhea
SI i d e 4 0	<section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><text><text><text></text></text></text></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header>	Clinical signs of END and HPAI in pet birds include the following: A. Depression B. Incoordination C. Leg paralysis
SI i d 4 1	D. Watery diarrhea E. Hemorrhagic lesions of the GI tract	Clinical signs of END and HPAI in pet birds also include: D. Watery diarrhea E. Hemorrhagic lesions of the gastrointestinal tract If you identify any of these signs in poultry or pet birds and a suspicious history, call your State Animal Health Official (SAHO) or USDA's toll free number at 1-866-536-7593 After hours:800-940-6524 for a local contact.
SI i d e 4 2	Clinical Signs – Pet Birds Poultry or Pet Birds: • Observe signs and suspicious history, call Assistant District Director (ADD) and State Animal Health Official (SAHO) Daytime: 866-536-7593 After hours: 800-940-6524	Clinical signs of END and HPAI in pet birds also include: D. Watery diarrhea E. Hemorrhagic lesions of the gastrointestinal tract If you identify any of these signs in poultry or pet birds and a suspicious history, call your ADD and SAHO USDA's toll free numbers are 1-866-536-7593 After hours:800-940-6524



SI i d 4 7	Biosecurity	The next section addresses biosecurity for pet bird enthusiasts as well as the poultry industry to prevent the introduction or spread of END and HPAI.
SI d 4 8	 Biosecurity for Pet Birds Maintain records of sales, shipments Quarantine newly introduced birds for 30 days Restrict movement of personnel Require strict sanitation Hegally imported or from U.S. stock Healthy Transported in new or disinfected containers 	 END and HPAI are disease threats to the caged-bird industry and poultry hobbyists if biosecurity is not practiced. In order to best protect avian populations, individuals in the pet bird industry should: Maintain records of all sales and shipments of flocks Quarantine all newly introduced (purchased or acquired) birds for at least 30 days Restrict movement of personnel between new (quarantined) and old birds Require strict sanitation of personnel and/or equipment that is shared between new (quarantined) and old birds Birds illegally smuggled into the United States that are not quarantined and tested by the USDA may carry infectious diseases. Individuals importing birds must request certification from suppliers that birds are: Legally imported or are from U.S. stock, Healthy prior to shipment, and Transported in new or thoroughly disinfected containers.
SI i d 4 9	Biosecurity for Commercial Poultry • "All-in, all-out" philosophy • Clean clothing' footwear, changing/ shower facilities, footwear disinfection • "All-in, all-out" philosophy • Clean clothing/ footwear, changing/ shower disinfection • "Avoid birds from live-bird markets • Avoid loaning/ borrowing equipment • Avoid keeping pet birds on-farm • Avoid visiting other poultry operations • Work with a veterinarian	 Good management and biosecurity practices are of the utmost importance to the commercial poultry industry. Essentials of good biosecurity practices should include: Only allowing essential workers and vehicles on the premises. Providing clean clothing/footwear and changing or shower facilities and footwear disinfection for employees. Cleaning and disinfecting (C&D) contaminated vehicles entering and leaving the premises. Avoid loaning or borrowing equipment or vehicles from other farms. Personnel should avoid visiting other poultry operations including live-bird markets. Maintaining an "all-in, all-out" philosophy of flock management with a single-age flock. Preventing poultry flocks from coming into contact with wild or migratory birds. Avoid bringing birds from live-bird markets back to the farm. Avoid keeping pet birds on the farm. Employing workers who own pet birds exposes poultry to increased disease risk; advise accordingly. Working with a veterinarian to submit diseased birds to a veterinary diagnostic laboratory for examination.

SI i d e 5 0	Effective Disinfectants Networks Might Pathogenic Arian Influenza (HPA) Outer University Instituted by heating to 131% for 3 brance Outer Outer Outer University Instituted by heating to 131% for 3 brance Outer	Disinfectants effective against both END and HPAI are sodium hypochlorite (6%), phenolics (e.g., One-Stroke Environ®), oxidizing agents (e.g., Virkon® S) and quaternary ammonium compounds (e.g., Roccal®-D Plus). END is inactivated by heating to 133°F for 3 hours or 140°F for 30 minutes; pH = 3 inactivates; formalin – efficacy is temperature dependent; chlorhexidine (Nolvasan® S), ether. HPAI is inactivated by heating to 133°F for 60 minutes; pH = 2 inactivates; Aldehydes (formalin, gluteraldehyde, formaldehyde); 70% ethanol, povidone-iodine, lipid solvents.
SI i d 5 1	Reporting a Suspect Exotic Avian Disease	
SI i d 5 2	<text><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></text>	In this scenario , you are a Category II veterinarian with an interest in avian and exotic animal medicine. Your interest and clinical experience in birds is becoming known in the area. You are seeing more cases every month and are enjoying this new practice builder. A new client, Mr. Jones, called this morning to make an appointment. He owns one of the two pet bird shops in town and you look forward to referrals from his business. You are booked up, but make time for him and his two young Amazons that have diarrhea.
SI i d e 5 3	 History Mr. Jones had the birds for 2 weeks Sick for a week All other birds in the shop are fine Birds fed pelleted bird food plus fresh Kept in one large, well-ventilated, clean wire cage Birds' origin unknown No known vaccinations 	Mr. Jones arrives for his appointment and you begin by taking a patient history . You learn he has had the birds since he picked them up about two weeks ago. They have been sick almost a week but all the other birds are fine. The birds eat a pelleted bird food along with fresh fruits and vegetables. They are both housed in one large wire cage. Mr. Jones' shop is very clean, with good ventilation and the birds are well taken care of. Mr. Jones' pet bird shop is part of a chain and

SI i d e 5 4	<section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><section-header><table-row></table-row><list-item></list-item></section-header></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></section-header>	Upon physical exam , you observe well fleshed birds with diarrhea, fluffed feathers, and mild coughing. The birds seem mildly depressed and mildly dehydrated. You begin to think about rule outs.
SI i d e 5 5	Treatment • Obtain blood sample for CBC, chemistry panel • Obtain fecal sample for float/smear/culture • Administer: • Subcutaneous fluids • Antibiotics, vitamins • Birds return to pet store • Wait for test results	Prior to administering treatment , you take blood to run a CBC and chemistry panel as well as feces for a float/smear/culture. While waiting for your results, you give the birds subcutaneous fluids and start them on antibiotics and vitamins. You send the owner and birds back to the pet store while waiting for results.
SI i d 5 6	 Provense for the second seco	The next day Mr. Jones calls in a panic. One of the sick birds has died and now several other birds in his shop are acting sick as well. Some birds are now showing neurological signs. Mr. Jones is overwhelmed with work as one of his weekend employees, Jason, just quit. Jason had a lot of experience as his family raises chickens in a backyard flock.
SI i d 5 7	<section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><section-header><section-header> <section-header> <section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></section-header>	Your differential list is narrowing as you now suspect this is an infectious disease. You question the Mr. Jones further regarding the source of the birds and he reluctantly tells you that, although he normally gets all his birds from the parent company, these last two came from a friend in the business for a "great price". You also learn that these birds were not separated from the other birds upon arrival.

SI i d e 5 8	<section-header><section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><section-header><list-item> <section-header></section-header></list-item></section-header></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></section-header></section-header>	Mr. Jones brings in one of the sick birds for a second physical examination and the dead bird for a necropsy. You examine the moribund bird and observe a pasty vent, difficulty breathing, mild torticollis, and petechial hemorrhages on the shanks. After examining this second sick bird, let's review what is known about this case.
SI d e 5 9	 Definitive Diagnosis ADD and SAHO assign FADD FADD performs necropsy at clinic. Hemorrhagic lesions in intestines Gema of submandibular region Samples sent to NVSL in Ames, IA Lab isolates END Lung from dead parrot Cloacal swabs of sick bird 	To achieve a definitive diagnosis , both the ADD and SAHO have access to trained Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians (FADD) in the area that can move this investigation forward. A FADD is sent to your clinic and performs the necropsy, which reveals hemorrhagic lesions in the intestines and edema of the submandibular region. The FADD packages and sends the samples to the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, IA as this is a suspicious FAD in an avian species. The laboratory isolates Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) virus in lung tissue from the dead parrot and in the cloacal swabs from the sick bird.
SI i d 6 0	Additional Follow-up	Besides cleaning and disinfecting the pet bird shop and veterinary clinic, additional follow-up steps need to occur. We will review that next.
SI i d e 6 1	<section-header><section-header><section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></section-header></section-header></section-header>	The final investigation report diagnosed Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) which resulted in your veterinary clinic and the pet bird shop being quarantined, and all sick and contact birds were euthanized. Findings from the investigation of this case would suggest that the virus was introduced by the young parrots purchased from a questionable source. The fact that the seller could not be located after the sale would suggest that the birds may have been smuggled into the U.S. Trace-back surveillance by state and federal officials of all birds sold during the estimated time that the virus may have been present in the pet store did not detect any other positive birds, nor from any of your clients that were in the clinic on the day Mr. Jones was there. Because there were no other reports of problems in pet birds in this and other states, it was concluded that this was an isolated introduction of END.

SI i d e 6 2	Conclusion	Due to prompt recognition, diagnostic testing, and involvement of the authorities, this outbreak was limited in its scope, unlike the 2002 outbreak in the southwestern U.S., where millions of birds had to be destroyed due to END. As a practitioner in the U.S., you are on the front lines of defense against foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. Your recognition of and prompt response to potential exotic avian diseases are essential to the livelihood of poultry producers and bird owners, and to public health given the zoonotic nature of HPAI.
SI i d e 6 3	 Summary Economic impact Hazards of less virulent forms of avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease (ND) viruses Clinical signs of HPAI and END Biosecurity measures Reporting an exotic avian disease 	In summary , this module described the economic impact of exotic avian disease outbreaks. As a practitioner in the U.S., you now have the tools to understand the differences in the types of avian influenza viruses as well as Newcastle disease viruses. When clinical signs present themselves in pet birds or poultry, you should be able to promptly recognize them, implement biosecurity measures to limit disease spread, and report your suspicions to the ADD and SAHO.
SI i d e 6 4	Supplemental Training • This informational presentation has been approved expressly to serve as one unit of supplemental training for participants in USDA's NVAP • Please ensure you complete, sign and retain a certificate stating that you attended this presentation • Contact your VS District Office for more details on accreditation renewal	<i>Presenters: Make sure your audience members know about obtaining credit for their attendance.</i> This informational presentation has been approved expressly to serve as one unit of supplemental training for participants in USDA's National Veterinary Accreditation Program. Please ensure you complete, sign and retain a certificate stating that you attended this presentation. Contact your VS District Office for more details on accreditation renewal.
SI i d e 6 5	<section-header><section-header><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item><list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></list-item></section-header></section-header>	This presentation was made possible, in part, by a Cooperative Agreement from the USDA-APHIS for the National Veterinary Accreditation Program. It was prepared by the Center for Food Security and Public Health at the College of Veterinary Medicine, Iowa State University. Authors include Katie Steneroden, DVM, MPH; Danelle Bickett-Weddle, DVM, MPH, PhD, DACVPM; Carrie Hammer, DVM, PhD; and Anna Rovid-Spickler, DVM, PhD. The illustrations in this presentation were designed by Travis Engelhaupt, Clint May, Andrew Kingsbury, and Dani Ausen. The content was reviewed within USDA-APHIS-VS by David Pyburn, DVM; Larry Miller, DVM; Fidelis Hegngi, DVM, MS. The content was also reviewed by Darrell Trampel, DVM, PhD, DACVP at the Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine The content has been reviewed and approved by USDA-APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs.

